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Abstract 
WikiLeaks—an online whistle-blowing organization based in Sweden—released documents 
from U.S. foreign diplomats, termed “the diplomatic cables,” on November 28, 2010.  Upon 
their release, politicians from both sides of the U.S. political spectrum condemned the 
organization.  This analysis demonstrates that the censure was not a result of 
unmanageable harm to U.S. foreign relations but because WikiLeaks violated the United 
States state secret privilege.  Through an inductive approach, a realpolitik perspective is 
adopted to make sense of the aftermath of the release.  Realpolitik is governance based on 
national interests which drives the decisions of the United State government.  State secrets, 
while certainly having legitimate uses, are used to cover up state crimes and misdeeds.  
They are kept because the government seeks to control its image and any information that 
can harm it.  Politicians and government leaders respond in a manner meant to neutralize 
threats to the state’s image and control of information.  This analysis demonstrates how 
realpolitik is at work through the responding political rhetoric to WikiLeaks release of the 
diplomatic cables through an examination of the use of arbitrary rhetoric—vague and open 
statements made by officials that leave room for interpretation favorable to the state—and 
the labeling of WikiLeaks as a criminal organization.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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WikiLeaks and Realpolitik 
WikiLeaks has teased the genie of transparency out of a very opaque bottle, and powerful 
forces in America, who thrive on secrecy, are trying desperately to stuff the genie back in. 
Col. Lawrence Wilkerson
1 
INTRODUCTION 
  As the year 2010 came to a close, one topic flickered across news sources 
throughout the United States and the world—WikiLeaks.  In particular, scrutiny was drawn 
to the whistle-blower organization because of the attention it garnered following the release 
of secret U.S. documents (emails from U.S. foreign diplomats) dubbed the “diplomatic 
cables.”  The political reaction was predominantly bipartisan and unified during this period 
with politicians from both sides of the U.S. political spectrum denouncing the release of the 
documents and condemning the organization.  This analysis focuses on the relationship 
between the release of the secret U.S. documents and the political reactions that followed. 
  WikiLeaks is an Internet-based whistle-blower organization currently operated out of 
Sweden and founded by an Australian, Julian Assange.  Notoriety for the organization was 
first achieved following the release of a classified video in 2009 which WikiLeaks entitled 
“Collateral Murder.”  This video featured a U.S. attack helicopter mistaking unarmed 
civilians (two of whom were reporters) as armed insurgents (Leigh & Harding, 2011).  The 
civilians were gunned down along with another civilian to another who stopped to help the 
wounded.  Two children were also hurt in the gunfire.  This video throttled WikiLeaks into 
the international spotlight. 
  One of the reasons for WikiLeaks’ international media status during this period was 
public officials’ reactions to the organization.  Following the release of the diplomatic cables, 
U.S. political officials claimed the leaks would hurt U.S. foreign policy despite an assessment 
by the Obama Administration that the damage would be “containable” (Hosenball, 2011).  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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Officials also called for measures to be taken against WikiLeaks that included labeling the 
organization as terrorist, prosecuting Julian Assange under the Espionage Act of 1917, and 
even calls for the execution of suspected leakers (“Biden Slams,” 2010; Kohn, 2010; Leigh 
& Harding, 2011; Poulsen, 2010; Rubin, 2010a; Rubin, 2010b).  These reactions reveal a 
government primarily concerned with preserving the image of the United States and 
maintaining its power. In other words, it indicates a government run on realpolitik.  
  This analysis will demonstrate a link between state secrecy, state crime, and 
realpolitik using evidence provided by the controversy surrounding WikiLeaks and the 
release of the diplomatic cables.  A review of realpolitik is provided accompanied by a brief 
discussion of the criminology of state crime.  At the end of this section is an explanation of 
relationship between state secrecy and state crime and how the realpolitik perspective can 
be used as a theoretical guide for understanding it.  What follows is a discussion of the 
results of an inductive analysis of U.S. political officials’ reactions (statements and actions) 
to WikiLeaks and how these reactions are demonstrative of realpolitik.  Before proceeding, 
however, a description of realpolitik is provided as a theoretical perspective for 
understanding state crime and, most important for this analysis, state secrecy.  A brief 
description of WikiLeaks as an organization will follow. 
REALPOLITIK 
Realpolitik is “a framework that serves as a guide for policymaking” and “is 
associated with the school of realism as a political theory of power and neo-realism as an 
interest-based theory” (Rothe, 2010, p. 113).  Simply stated, a realpolitik nation-state 
makes decisions guided by rational self-interest rather than by morality (Rothe, 2010).  
Realpolitik, “assumes that everyone is out to maximize their own interest, and that states 
are out to maximize their interests as well” (Anderson, 2009, p. 3).  A nation-state guided 
by realpolitik tends to focus on the security of its national independence which can be Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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achieved through measures to attain power such as military, economic, and/or political 
might (Wayman & Diehl, 1994).  The realpolitik mode of governance is a rational-decision 
based calculus that derives itself from post-Westphalian enlightenment thinking (Maogoto, 
2004).  This particular conceptualization of realpolitik has been expanded to also consider 
the different institutions within the nation-state (like the economy, the military, and political 
institutions) that may have competing interests that are at odds with each other (Rothe, 
2010).  The realpolitik perspective has been used by scholars to understand or explain 
foreign policy and international relations in many countries such as China (Christensen, 
1996; Xin, 2010), Soviet Russia (Kober, 1990), Indonesia (Balachandran, 2007), and the 
United States (Kober, 1990).  
  While realpolitik’s origins as a term are attributed to the late 19
th century (Rothe, 
2010) the underlying philosophy of realism has been traced back to the Greek historian, 
Thucydides (Wayman & Diehl, 1994).  The concept of realpolitik in national governance has 
further roots dating back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 that occurred following the end 
of the Thirty Years War fought between the Protestant and Catholic states (Maogoto, 2004; 
Shearing & Johnston, 2010).  This period saw the establishment of the modern nation-state.  
Borders were fixed and sovereignty was bestowed to the national leaders, who largely had 
impunity within their borders.  As Maogoto (2004) states, “The post-Westphalian era 
reinforced the government’s duty to maximize the assets of their states (through militarism 
and conquest) without regard to the consequences (real or hypothetical) to society” (p. 2). 
  While alternatives to realism-based perspectives on governance have existed prior, a 
shift away from the post-Westphalian realpolitik occurred following World War I and began 
in earnest after World War II.  “It took the senseless mayhem of World War I—the 
destruction of economic structures, dissipation of financial resources, and undermining of 
political stability—to erase the traditional notion that war was a rational political act” 
(Maogoto, 2004, p. 4).  The widespread chaos and destruction of the World Wars produced Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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the idea that bestowing national sovereigns with power unchecked within their borders 
except by war was not a desirable mode of maintaining peace in a rapidly globalizing world.  
Realism and realpolitik is underpinned by the work of philosophers such as Machiavelli and 
Hobbes who advocated an “ends justify the means” approach of the state (Strauss, 1936; 
Strauss, 1958).  In a very strict sense, this tradition emphasizes that the state pursue the 
goals of national security and stability regardless of the ethical or moral dubiousness of the 
means because the benefits of a stable and powerful nation were of the upmost importance.  
Conversely, idealism is influenced by the Kantian philosophical tradition and it emphasizes 
that the ends do not always justify the means (Wayman & Diehl, 1994).  The goals of the 
state must be attained justly and the preservation of morality and democracy are key 
concerns of the idealist perspective.  Importantly for this analysis, realism holds 
governments should be secretive and amoral and determined to maintain military security 
(Wayman & Diehl, 1994).  Idealism, however, “believe that governments should be open 
and honest” (Wayman & Diehl, 1994, p. 14). 
  Idealism began to interject itself more prominently into international affairs during 
and after the period of the World Wars (Wayman & Diehl, 1994).  Starting with The 
Nuremburg Trials following World War II, an international penal process was “practically 
inaugurated” (Maogoto, 2004, p. 5).  The establishment of the United Nations and the 
International Criminal Court occurred during the post-Nuremburg period.  These institutions 
were oriented towards maintaining peace among nations and, most importantly, 
safeguarding human rights.  Ideally international jurisprudence moves away from realpolitik 
but certainly a nation could participate for its own interests of power.  With a body of 
international law, state sovereigns could be, hypothetically, held accountable for their 
actions inside and outside their own borders.  A transition to a world governed by ethics and 
responsibility was not complete, however.  Still today, a tension is maintained between 
realpolitik governance and more idealism-based governance. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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  In a dialectical sense then, a nation-state and its various institutions are capable of 
exhibiting features of both realpolitik and idealism.  Countries can vary on the intensity 
realpolitik influences their decisions and behaviors.  Realpolitik often cannot account for all 
decision making by a nation-state (Christensen, 1996).  It would be appropriate to think of 
realpolitik and idealism as different points on a balancing scale.  Too much of either can lead 
to negative consequences.  A government too guided by realpolitik will sacrifice more 
moralistic principles of governance which many people value such as the democratic 
process.  A government which is too idealist, however, may sacrifice national security and 
political stability as a result transparency and democracy because these values allow people 
to initiate rapid political change (Kober, 1990).  Philosophical compromises between 
idealism and realism exist which may be more beneficial for balanced governance such as 
ethical realism (Carlson, 2008). 
  Historically there is reason to believe idealism and realism have served as competing 
philosophies of American foreign policy (Kober, 1990).  Under idealism, power arises from 
the will of well-informed democratic peoples and foreign policy decisions are predicated 
from this (Kober, 1990).  Under realism, power circulates among national leaders.  Political 
stability arises from a balance of powers amongst leadership; powers guided by the 
interests of the nation-state (Kober, 1990).  Evidence currently suggests the United States 
has become an intensely realpolitik-oriented nation-state during and after the Cold-War 
period where realpolitik’s emphasis on balancing powers was prominent (Kober, 1990).  In 
recent times, scholars have documented how the U.S. bypassed international law and 
protocol in conducting its affairs such as the War on Terror and the War in Iraq, an act 
which has been termed “unilateralism” (Alvarez, 2004; Jones, 2004; Weiss, Crahan, & 
Goering, 2004).  Underlying unilateralism is a belief that the United States is somehow 
exceptional; it alone is exempt from international law (Mertus, 2005).  While simultaneously 
espousing the benefits of international law and cooperation, many of the actions of the U.S. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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do not match those ideals such as the unilateral War in Iraq and the detention and 
subsequent abuse of ‘suspected terrorists’ in camps like those in Guantanamo Bay and 
Bagram (Scott, 2004; Weiss, Crahan, & Goering, 2004; Sands, 2008).  Realpolitik 
governance—like that exhibited by the U.S.—can generate casualties which can include 
human rights, government transparency, and political dissent.  These examples of 
realpolitik were initially protected from citizen oversight by the state secrets privilege (which 
will be discussed in more detail below).  Nation-states hold secrets to prevent abuses of 
power or other illegitimate behaviors from discovery while seeking to maximize its interests.  
  For the purposes of criminology, the realpolitik perspective serves as a theoretical 
framework in which to understand state crime, state-corporate crime, as well state 
avoidance of punishment.  In order to maximize their interests—which can be economic, 
militaristic, diplomatic, etc.—nation-states can engage in a myriad of criminal and other 
harmful activities that ignore the well-being of its or other nation’s citizens.  The realpolitik 
perspective can—and has been (Rothe, 2009)—used in the state crime theoretical 
framework.  First openly advocated for in criminology by William Chambliss (1989) in his 
American Society of Criminology presidential address, researchers developing this 
framework have made great strides in our understanding of state crime in which theoretical 
refinement continues  (Rothe, Ross, Mullins, Friedrichs, Michalowski, Barak, Kauzlarich, & 
Kramer, 2009).  The state crime perspective asserts traditional definitions of crime are 
problematic because they often do not account for crimes of the powerful.  Instead, myopic 
and legalistic definitions are adopted which exclude many activities conducted by societal 
elites.  In order to include these actions, state crime scholars define crime as that which 
generates social harm (Rothe et al., 2009) and state crime as “the harm illegally or legally 
organized and inflicted upon people by their own governments or the governments of 
others” (Barak, 1990, p. 11).  As evidenced above, realpolitik governance can be 
criminogenic because of the social harm it can generate like detainee abuse and torture.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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American war crimes have been revealed through the release of the war logs and 
through the video “Collateral Murder.”  While the diplomatic cables may not reveal crimes 
and misdeeds of the magnitude found in the war logs, they still catalog foreign policy and 
diplomatic misconduct which generates social harm.  Using diplomats to spy on various 
United Nations officials can be detrimental to foreign relations (Leigh & Harding, 2011) as is 
the U.S. obstruction of a “torture probe” by Spain (Rosenberg, 2010).  Another cable 
unveiled U.S. meddling in Haitian politics (Ives, 2011).  These three examples demonstrate 
U.S. engagement in activities that undermine foreign relations which are vital for a 
functioning body of international jurisprudence.  Realpolitik explains why those events—and 
others—may have occurred and why the government became so upset when revealed.  It is 
posited here that the United States was largely not concerned with maintaining foreign 
relations for ethical or moralistic reasons.  Rather, these relationships were manipulated and 
maintained for the state’s own interests.  The mode of governance also helps explain the 
subsequent reaction of U.S. officials to the leaked documents, as shown in the following 
analysis.  
While the leaked documents do present instances of social harm, they largely reveal 
relatively mundane details about U.S. diplomacy.  Many of the details were considered to be 
so prosaic that the damage from the leaks was considered to be containable by the Obama 
Administration (Hosenball, 2011).  The political and media controversy over WikiLeaks was 
a reaction to the leaking secret documents rather than the content of the documents 
themselves.  Here, intense realpolitik is demonstrated to not only drive events of social 
harm but their concealment.   
Secrecy is an important tool for a modern nation-state but it can be abused, 
particularly under realpolitik.  State secrecy occurs when nation-states withhold information 
from the public. The goal is supposed to be self-preservation and the benefit of its citizens.  
State secrecy certainly has appropriate uses.  Few reasonable people want nuclear missile Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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codes and schematics freely available to the rest of the world.  In a democratic society, 
however, state secrecy can present a problem for government accountability (Kutz, 2009; 
Weaver & Pallitto, 2005).  Three mechanisms are built into democracy supposedly allow 
citizens to oversee and control sovereigns—elections, public opinion, and public deliberation 
(Sagar, 2007).  Each of these mechanisms requires a well-informed citizenry to make 
decisions which should serve to control national leaders according to idealism/democratic 
theory (Sagar, 2007; Kober, 1990).  A well-informed citizenry, however, is a potential 
threat to political order and stability.  Citizens who are informed about abuses of power and 
violations of the law will be less likely to support the current political order which may act as 
a catalyst for political change (Kober, 1990).  Indeed, idealism dictates a true democracy 
with a well informed populace provides protections against acts of aggression by the state 
and this combination is more likely to support political change rather than stability and 
national interests (Kober, 1990). 
For state secrecy to operate power must be given to the executive to decide what 
should (and should not be) qualified as a state secret.  Citizens have to trust the capacity to 
decide what information to withhold is handled appropriately.  This capability presents an 
immense amount of power to entrust a sovereign with.  The state secrets privilege allows 
the state to withhold evidence from criminal cases against it (Ziegler, 2008) and implement 
laws and policies away from the purview of citizen oversight (Kutz, 2009).  The privilege 
was formally instituted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds (1953) and is 
recognized as a legitimate instrument of the executive to prevent sensitive evidence from 
being revealed that could harm national security (Ziegler, 2008).  As stated before, there 
certainly can be legitimate uses of the state secrets doctrine.  The use of the doctrine, 
however, has expanded in the post-9/11 era (Ziegler, 2008).  Currently, “there is a real 
danger that the government is using the privilege not to protect national security, but to 
cover up its own wrongdoing” (Ziegler, 2008, p. 692).  Wrongdoing is often the result of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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political officials engaging in acts of corruption, implementing policies that are illegal, or 
implementing laws or legal caveats without informing the populace (Weaver & Pallitto, 
2005).  
 Sagar (2007) suggests one mechanism, out of many, that may be the most 
effective for government accountability which he calls circumvention (otherwise known as 
leaking).  Many of the revelations of state crime and corruption brought to public attention 
are not revealed through mechanisms built into the structure of the government.  They 
appear on the front pages of newspapers (Sagar, 2007).  Leaks have provided details on 
state crimes and political corruption like The Pentagon Papers scandal from the Nixon era 
and the uncovering of detainee abuse, illegal use of wiretaps, and the practice of 
extraordinary rendition during George W. Bush’s presidency.  Given the latitude, within 
intense realpolitik, executives will over-use the state secrets privilege to avoid control and 
accountability. 
The state reacts frantically when information is leaked on it or its officials.  Leaking 
presents a threat to the power of the nation-state.  If the state was concerned with the 
proper use of state secrets and the prevention of state crime and corruption then one would 
imagine these leaks—while violating the state secret privilege—would be accepted because 
they reveal problem policies and state secrets used to hide important information integral to 
democratic decision making by citizens.  These leaks, as one can see from the WikiLeaks 
example presented later in this analysis, are largely met with condemnation regardless of 
what type of information is leaked.  Rather than accepting problems, the priority is to 
control information and the image of the state.  
In short, if citizens want to control state crime and corruption, according to 
democratic theory, they must be well informed (Sagar, 2007).  The ability of states to hold 
secrets threatens this ability particularly when the state is allowed to decide what counts as Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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secret information.  Any checks on the power of state secrecy, however, are problematic 
because they exclude citizens from the process (because, otherwise information is no longer 
secret).  Leaking may be the only mechanism available for citizens to gain information on 
the government and determine if a state secret is problematic (Sagar, 2007).  Realpolitik 
governance, at this point, steps in and demands this not occur because, as history shows, 
many of the leaks do not display the state favorably.  In this sense, leaking presents a 
threat to the state’s public image and, vicariously, power via public legitimacy.  Before 
proceeding with the analysis, however, it would be beneficial to provide a more detailed 
description of WikiLeaks. 
WIKILEAKS 
  WikiLeaks is a self-described “non-profit media organization” dedicated towards 
government transparency and unveiling human rights abuses around the world.  The group 
was started by Julian Assange and others in 2006 (Huor & Lindquist, 2010; Leigh & Harding, 
2011).  WikiLeaks acts as an online venue for whistle-blowers to submit secret or classified 
documents (Leigh & Harding, 2011).  Their focus is allowing leakers to hand documents 
over while protecting anonymity through various security measures such as TOR (the onion 
router) and PGP (pretty good privacy) (Leigh & Harding, 2011).
2  Once the documents are 
received, WikiLeaks hands them over to volunteers who verify the information and further 
obfuscate the identity of the leaker (Huor & Lindquist, 2010).  Originally, in 2006, WikiLeaks 
hoped the general public would sift through the documents.  Because of difficulty, however, 
of generating interest and interpreting the documents they now rely on professional 
journalists to help with the dissemination of stories contained in the leaks (Leigh & Harding, 
2011).  
  WikiLeaks was initially conflicted about where to base itself.  The organization 
eventually settled in Sweden because of the nation’s protective freedom of speech laws Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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(Huor & Lindquist, 2010).  The organization needs strong legal sheltering due to the 
sensitivity of the documents released.  These documents include a U.S. Army training 
manual that reveals the sanctifying of harsh treatment of detainees at various military 
detention centers; a video of helicopter gunners killing civilians in Iraq; email messages 
from a private email account from former Alaskan Governor Sarah Palin used to bypass U.S. 
transparency laws; around 91,000 documents on the War in Afghanistan; nearly 400,000 
leaked documents on the War in Iraq; and the diplomatic cables of concern for this analysis 
(Bohannon, 2010; Huor & Lindquist, 2010; O’Loughlin, Witmer, Linke, & Thorwardson, 
2010).  
The diplomatic cables are leaked emails from U.S. foreign diplomats.  While many of 
the emails reveal relatively mundane details about U.S. foreign relations, they also unveil a 
darker side of U.S. diplomacy. As Leigh & Harding (2011) describe them: 
The cables discussed human rights abuses, corruption, and dubious financial ties 
between G8 leaders.  They spoke of corporate espionage, dirty tricks and hidden 
bank accounts. In their private exchanges, US diplomats dispense with the platitudes 
that characterise much of their public job; they give relatively frank, unmediated 
assessments, offering a window into the mental processes at the top of US power. 
(p. 212) 
WikiLeaks’ release of classified and secret documents, particularly the diplomatic 
cables, have incited controversy yet few academic studies have been published on the 
whistle-blower organization (Allan & Andén-Papadopoulos; Heisbourg, 2011; O’Loughlin et 
al., 2010), which none have studied political or public rhetoric.  It is precisely this gap in the 
literature this analysis seeks to fill.  The following analysis of public official’s responses to 
the leak of the diplomatic cables is demonstrative of this realpolitik approach towards state 
secrecy.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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ANALYSIS: WIKILEAKS AND REALPOLITIK 
Methodology 
  In the events surrounding the controversy of the diplomatic cables’ release, common 
themes emerged in the rhetoric of public officials.  Generally, statements seemed to avoid 
issues revealed by the documents and focused on condemning WikiLeaks.  At this juncture, 
further investigation was merited through a content analysis which involved a systematic 
collection of news articles to locate public official’s reactions (both statements and actions) 
concerning the organization.  For the analysis, an inductive grounded theoretical approach 
was adopted.  This methodology is divided into two separate parts: the sampling procedure 
for the news articles and the grounded theory approach applied to this study.  
The units of analysis for this study were statements and actions of politicians 
concerning WikiLeaks, suspected leakers, and the release of the diplomatic cables as 
published in news media.  According to priming theory, news media’s choices of coverage 
have the power to “prime” or predispose public opinion to be shifted in a particular direction 
on a topic, such as WikiLeaks (Brug, Semetko, & Valkenburg, 2007; Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990).  Because news media often relies on government officials 
to provide information or perspective, these officials have an immense amount of power in 
shaping public opinion.  As Zaller (1992) states, “when elites uphold a clear picture of what 
should be done, the public tends to see events from that point of view, with the most 
politically attentive members of the public most likely to adopt the elite position” ( p. 9).  
This power to prime also implies the power to manipulate.  This analysis demonstrates that 
government officials’ public statements, as presented in mass media outlets, attempt to 
manipulate public opinion by presenting WikiLeaks in a manner conducive to realpolitik 
governance.  For the purposes of this analysis, politicians or officials are defined as, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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“persons who are elected into a public office or those who publically represent those 
elected.”  
 A sample of these reactions was gathered through a systematic search of online 
news articles.  To be included, articles had to be dated between December 1st, 2010 and 
January 18
th, 2011.  This period was when media and government officials were focusing on 
WikiLeaks after the organization had begun releasing the diplomatic cables on November 
28
th, 2010.  Establishing the data range at December 1
st allowed time for the news of the 
leak to spread; for political officials to react; and media outlets to report on the reactions of 
political officials.  The January 18
th cutoff was selected because, at this point, coverage of 
the release of the diplomatic cables slowed.  The reader should note this methodology was 
used to search for a plethora of news articles that document government official’s 
statements for or against WikiLeaks to ensure as many political reactions as possible were 
included in the analysis.   
Previous studies using online news articles have relied on Internet news search 
engines provide relevant articles (Adams & Jennison, 2007; Carlson, 2007; Stinson, 
Liederbach, & Freiburger, 2011).  This approach, however, yielded far too many articles for 
this particular analysis.  For example, Google News displayed 60,800 results for the term 
“WikiLeaks” within the sampling time frame.  Because of this plethora of results, this study 
used a selection of popular online news sites instead: CNN, MSNBC, Fox News, The 
Washington Post, The Wall-Street Journal, The New York Times, Wired Magazine, AlterNet, 
and The Huffington Post.  
CNN, MSNBC, Fox News, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and The New 
York Times were chosen because they are popular mainstream news sources.  Wired 
Magazine was chosen for its exclusive reporting of WikiLeaks related news, hacking, and 
hacktivism.  AlterNet was selected because it specializes in stories that pass under the radar Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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of mainstream press.  Finally, The Huffington Post was selected because it is a popular news 
website which specializes in aggregating multiples sources of news.  By searching AlterNet 
and The Huffington Post, relevant results from other websites were incorporated into the 
sample without sifting through many of the superfluous results offered by online news 
search engines.  Websites for the initial search are referred to as primary outlets while 
results stemming from links given in primary outlets are called tertiary outlets which include 
news articles from other websites, posts from reputable blogs, and videos about WikiLeaks, 
the diplomatic cables, and politicians’ statements.  
Each website was searched for the term “WikiLeaks.” After the initial search and the 
following incorporation of other websites, a total of 843 websites, blogs, and videos (hereby 
referred to as “sources”) were yielded.  These sources were then scanned for discussion of 
public official’s rhetoric or behaviors towards WikiLeaks and its affiliates which wrought 78 
results.  A source was considered relevant to analysis if it specifically mentioned a political 
official’s statements about WikiLeaks or its affiliates (leakers, employers, or leaders).  
Sources which described actions taken by the government against WikiLeaks and its 
affiliates were also considered.  Additionally, Leigh & Harding (2011) —executive editor and 
journalist respectively—in their book WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy, 
documented political rhetoric and actions as well.  This book is treated as a source of data 
for analysis which brings the total of data sources to 79.  There was a great deal of 
repetition in these sources.  This repetition is beneficial because it provides multiples 
sources to verify statements or actions used in the analysis.  It is, however, limited in that 
only statements and actions that received media attention are included.  Total, there are 14 
statements/speeches
3 and 12 actions
4 which are the subject of the ensuing analysis.  Table 
1 provides a summary of the Internet-based sources. 
 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
January, 2012, Vol. 4(1): 14-52                                                                                    Steinmetz 
 
30 
 
Table 1 
List of Sources 
Primary Outlets  
WikiLeaks 
Sources 
Gathered 
Sources 
Relevant 
to Analysis 
 
CNN  58  1 
 
MSNBC  64  2 
 
Fox News  68  4 
 
The New York Times  32  2 
 
Wired Magazine  27  1 
 
The Huffington Post  123  15 
 
AlterNet  26  4 
 
The Washington Post  281  33 
 
The Wall Street Journal  164  6 
Tertiary Outlets 
 
 
The Guardian 
 
2 
 
Reuters 
 
1 
 
National Journal 
 
1 
 
The Atlantic 
 
1 
 
Blogs 
 
2 
 
MyFDL 
 
1 
 
Newser 
 
1 
 
CBS News     1 
        Total  843  78 
 
 
The sampling technique chosen for this study was designed to attain a reasonably 
comprehensive list of public officials’ reactions.  This comprehensive technique also provides 
a solid foundation to begin grounded theory analysis.  As Charmaz (2006) states, “grounded 
theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing 
qualitative data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves” (p. 2).  This 
involves an inductive approach to the data that proceeds from the empirical to gradually 
more abstract categories and themes (Charmaz, 2006).  Rather than beginning with a 
theory and then gathering data to prove or verify it, this approach allows the data to speak Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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freely with theories and explanations bending and conforming to the data (Strauss & Corbin, 
1999).  The primary virtue of grounded theory as a methodological approach to analyzing 
qualitative data is its flexibility which allows the approach to be tailored for the needs of 
each study (Charmaz, 2006).  This analysis began with the statements and actions of 
politicians, contextualized them, and then worked up—through inductive synthesis—to a 
theoretical framework organized by realpolitik and state secrecy.  What follows is the result 
of this inductive approach. 
U.S. Realpolitik 
  The period of time following the release of the diplomatic cables was rife with 
realpolitik.  U.S. officials were quick to publicly denounce WikiLeaks.  The rhetoric used 
ranged from simple condemnations, to threats of legal punishment, and even to calls for 
execution.  Two general themes emerged in the data that organize this analysis.  The first 
regards statements made about whistle-blowing that are, on their surface, supportive but 
leave room for the U.S. realpolitik state to interpret a given situation/person/group as 
within or outside the scope of their conceptualization of ‘whistle-blower’ which I have 
termed arbitrary rhetoric.  Analysis of this theme focuses specifically on statements and 
actions made by the Obama Administration who claimed to uphold values of Internet 
freedom, whistle-blowing, and political dissent but discussed WikiLeaks and its affiliates in a 
way that denied them an association with those values.  The Obama Administration was not 
purposely selected to be the thrust of this section. Rather, officials from the administration 
provided the most evidence for the idea of arbitrary rhetoric.  
The second theme concerns realpolitik-driven condemnation of WikiLeaks in addition 
to the political labeling of the organization as criminal or terrorist.  By labeling the 
organization negatively the government can exercise its legitimacy over it.  Both of these 
concepts work together in tandem.  The problems of arbitrary rhetoric are easier to overlook Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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when the object of discussion is characterized as an “other” or different than the ideal.  This 
particular section incorporates political officials outside of the Obama Administration.  
Arbitrary Rhetoric   
The first area of political discourse in which realpolitik is apparent in is the arbitrary 
rhetoric of the Obama Administration.  The first example is from Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton.  As Secretary of State, Secretary Clinton acts as the representative of U.S. foreign 
policy and her statements generally convey the U.S. federal government’s stance on the 
Internet, free speech, and government transparency.  In a speech given on January 21
st, 
2010, Secretary Clinton heralded the virtues of technology as well as offered words of 
caution about the associated dangers: 
In many respects, information has never been so free.  There are more ways to 
spread more ideas to more people than at any moment in history.  Even in 
authoritarian countries, information networks are helping people discover new facts 
and making governments more accountable…The same networks that help organize 
movements for freedom also enable al Qaeda to spew hatred and incite violence 
against the innocent.  Any technologies with the potential to open up access to 
government and promote transparency can also be hijacked by governments to 
crush dissent and deny human rights. (Clinton, 2010a) 
In this speech, Secretary Clinton appears to welcome political dissent and whistle-blowing 
and condemn countries that seek to suppress opposition.  By invoking al Qaeda, however, 
Clinton has left room for interpretation.  This allows the government to characterize an 
organization as using the Internet in a similar manner to al Qaeda or using it for 
“legitimate” freedom-fighting purposes.  Here, the Internet is characterized as a tool which 
can be used for socially beneficial or detrimental ends.  Determining what is detrimental or 
beneficial is something left to the interpretation of the U.S. government.  This arbitrary Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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interpretation can be seen months later when Secretary Clinton, in response to the leaked 
diplomatic cables, condemned the actions of WikiLeaks: 
There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing 
brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our 
common security depends.  There have been examples in history in which official 
conduct has been made public in the name of exposing wrongdoings or misdeeds.  
This is not one of those cases.  (Clinton, 2010b) 
  Originally, the administration vocally supported whistle-blowing and government 
transparency.  The government, however, in exercising arbitrary rhetoric, interpreted 
WikiLeaks as not constituting a whistle-blower organization and condemned them following 
the leaks of the diplomatic cables.  Secretary Clinton claimed the Internet can be a valuable 
tool for exercising democracy and protest.  When documents informing the people of the 
activities of the U.S. government were released, however, the whistle-blowers were 
construed as a hindrance and a danger to the activities of the United States.  The 
government chose to interpret WikiLeaks as an organization seeking to undermine security 
and peace rather than as a whistle-blower organization.  
The next point of discussion concerns the Obama Administration in general with 
emphasis on President Obama and Vice President Biden.  Once President Obama was 
elected president, the website Change.gov was launched for the purposes of the transition 
between presidencies.  Here, President Obama and Vice President Biden detailed their vision 
for ethics in their coming administration (http://change.gov/agenda/ethics_agenda/).  One 
of the items mentioned was the protection of whistle-blowers: 
Often the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in government is 
an existing government employee committed to public integrity and willing to speak 
out… Barack Obama will strengthen whistleblower laws to protect federal workers Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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who expose waste, fraud, and abuse of authority in government.  Obama will ensure 
that federal agencies expedite the process for reviewing whistleblower claims and 
whistleblowers have full access to courts and due process. (Change.gov) 
Note that a whistle-blower is a “government employee committed to public integrity and 
willing to speak out.”  What constitutes public integrity is not defined.  Here, a promise is 
made to uphold the values of government transparency and whistle-blowing but the 
promise relies on many flexible buzzwords such as “integrity,” “abuse of authority,” and 
“wrongdoing.”  By not being defined these are concepts open to interpretation.  This renders 
Obama and Biden’s statement on whistle-blowing as arbitrary rhetoric. 
President Obama pledged to create a more open and transparent government when 
elected and vowed to protect whistle-blowers.  When WikiLeaks forced government 
transparency on the United States, however, the President decided to exercise the potential 
of arbitrary rhetoric.  During this time, the Administration struggled to find ways to 
prosecute Julian Assange and detained Private First Class (PFC) Bradley Manning, a 
suspected leaker who worked for U.S. Army Intelligence.  Interpretation of WikiLeaks and 
its associates’ actions were subject to arbitrary rhetoric driven by a realpolitik mentality.  
Designating who is or is not a whistle-blower is left to the state to determine.  The message 
is those who force government transparency in other countries should be exalted but this is 
not the case for those who force transparency on the United States. 
  Initially, the government wanted to prosecute Assange under the Espionage Act of 
1917 (Kohn, 2010).  This Act sought to prevent the theft of state secrets concerning 
national defense with the purpose to harm the United States; efforts to drive others refuse 
to fulfill duties; and the obstruction military recruitment or enlistment (Galison, 2010; 
Stone, 2003; Stone, 2009).  Essentially, the two purposes of the Act were to protect 
documents sensitive to national defense and the prevent propaganda warfare (Galison, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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2010; Stone, 2003).  The problem with using The Espionage Act against Julian Assange is 
he is neither a U.S. citizen nor was he the one who initially leaked the documents 
prosecution was not possible.  In response, the SHIELD Act (Securing Human Intelligence 
and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act) was proposed in both houses of Congress (Poulsen, 
2010).  This Act was aimed to be an amendment to the Espionage Act.  As Poulsen (2010) 
stated, the Act would “make it a federal crime for anyone to publish the name of a U.S. 
intelligence source… a direct swipe at the secret-spilling website WikiLeaks.”  As critics have 
pointed out, this may violate the First Amendment since the act could be applied to those 
who publish leaked documents after receiving them (Poulsen, 2010; Stone, 2011).  In 
addition, efforts were made during this time to establish a direct link between Assange and 
Manning.  If this connection could be made then Assange could be charged as a conspirator 
under the Espionage Act (Savage, 2010).  From this evidence, the conclusion drawn is the 
U.S. government is not making an effort to protect whistle-blowers.  Just the opposite has 
occurred; the U.S. reserves the right to define who is and who is not a whistle-blower and 
seeks ways to prosecute those who are not categorized as such.  
  Disregard for the protection of whistle-blowers was demonstrated by the detention of 
suspected leaker, PFC Bradley Manning.  At the time of this analysis, Manning was detained 
in conditions some consider torture (Coombs, 2010; Greenwald, 2010; Holland, 2010) 
primarily through social isolation which can have dire consequences (Arrigo & Bullock, 
2008).  While this treatment of Manning may be legal under current U.S. federal and 
military law, it does not seem like treatment appropriate for a whistle-blower who was 
supposed to have deserved the protection of the Obama Administration.  Manning was not 
protected and seems to have been punished without due process for whistle-blowing which 
was promised by the Obama Administration.  
  Arbitrary rhetoric allows the state to make contingent promises and mandates while 
allowing elites to decide which groups or individuals will be protected or considered by Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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them.  The argument here is the process of employing arbitrary rhetoric and then deciding 
who is covered is a result of intense realpolitik.  In WikiLeaks’ case, arbitrary rhetoric 
allowed the state to choose to interpret the organization as not to be protected as legitimate 
whistle-blowers.  If they do not count as legitimate whistle-blowers then the administration 
can legitimately pursue them for revealing state secrets.  The next section describes the 
next component necessary for the arbitrary rhetoric to work and how it has been applied to 
WikiLeaks. 
Condemnation and Labeling of WikiLeaks 
The use of arbitrary rhetoric by the Obama Administration—as interested as it may 
be—is not the only evidence of U.S. interest-based realpolitik governance at work.  The 
concept only leaves room for interpretation by government officials.  The other component 
necessary for the success of arbitrary rhetoric is labeling.  For persons or groups to be 
subjected to arbitrary rhetoric, they must be characterized in such a way that makes it 
appropriate.  Many political officials have made statements and claims about WikiLeaks 
which reflect this.  These statements have characterized WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, and 
leakers as terrorists and criminals.  The labeling found here is similar to that described by 
Howard Becker (1963). This process involves a group (the government), “making rules 
whose infraction constitutes deviance,” (Becker, 1963, p. 9) and then applying the label of 
“deviant” or “criminal” to those who violate the rules.  The rule is the state secrets doctrine 
whose use, in this case, is guided by realpolitik, embodied in arbitrary rhetoric, and involves 
protecting United States’ authority and interests.  WikiLeaks violated this rule and is thus 
labeled deviant. 
 The labeling of WikiLeaks emerged from both sides of the U.S. political spectrum.  
Vice President Biden, Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs Philip Crowley, and Rep. Peter King asserted Julian Assange and/or Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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WikiLeaks constitute a “high-tech” terrorist organization (“Biden Slams,” 2010; Leigh & 
Harding, 2011; Rubin, 2010b; Sheridan, 2010).  Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Sen. Jeff 
Sessions argued for the prosecution of WikiLeaks (Rubin, 2010a; Serwer, 2010).  In a move 
that could be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate media outlets from publishing stories 
based out of the leaked documents, Sen. Joe Lieberman suggested The New York Times 
may have violated the Espionage Act by receiving the diplomatic cables and running stories 
from them (Mirkinson, 2010).  Secretary Clinton, former Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, 
Attorney General Eric Holder, Sen. Lieberman, Sen. Susan Collins, and Sen. John Kerry 
claimed the release of the diplomatic cables harmed U.S. international relations and placed 
various diplomats and insiders in danger (Lieberman & Collins, 2011; Samuels, 2010; 
Virginia, 2010).  These statements do not address the state’s ethical problems shown by the 
cables.  The statements address the safety of those who may have engaged in activity 
potentially detrimental to foreign relations or the safety of the nation.  While this may be a 
valid concern, it ignores any problems revealed by the leaks which need to be addressed.  
All of these statements, cries, outrages, and general rhetoric by political officials are 
demonstrative of realpolitik.  Little concern is given towards the details and the content of 
the leaked documents.  Any problems revealed remain unacknowledged.  The only concern 
is someone has threatened U.S. control of information and the belief is this 
person/organization should be prosecuted, condemned, and/or executed.  
By categorizing WikiLeaks as an organization engaged in illegal behavior, the U.S. 
government made obtaining funding more difficult and indirectly punished the organization 
for crimes it had not been formally charged with at the time of this analysis.  Shortly after 
the release of the diplomatic cables, a number of financial operations—such as Visa, 
MasterCard, PayPal, and Bank of America—stopped processing donations to WikiLeaks 
(Addley & Halliday, 2010; McCarthy, 2010; Satter & Lawless, 2010).  These companies 
discontinued processing payments supposedly because of alleged illegal activities engaged Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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in by the organization or supposed breaching of policy (Addley & Halliday, 2010; Satter & 
Lawless, 2010; Musil, 2010).  It could be the case that these companies have stopped 
processing payments because they did not want to be implicated if WikiLeaks was shown to 
be engaged in illegal activity.  Currently no evidence exists that the organization broke any 
laws.  It may also be that these companies desisted because of pressure and labeling from 
the U.S. government.  Osama Bedier, PayPal’s vice-president of platform, said the state 
department issued a letter to them declaring WikiLeaks’ activities as illegal and they were to 
suspend WikiLeaks’ account (Addley & Halliday, 2010).   
In addition to their finances, server space for WikiLeaks was under attack.  When the 
diplomatic cables were first leaked, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks were 
conducted against WikiLeaks’ servers (Leigh & Harding, 2011).  These attacks brought 
WikiLeaks’ website down.  Assange then moved WikiLeaks to Amazon’s “Elastic Cloud 
Computing” servers which were capable of withstanding the DDoS attacks.  Sen. Lieberman, 
however, did not find this acceptable and, “called Amazon and urged them to stop hosting 
WikiLeaks” (Leigh & Harding, 2011, p. 205).  Amazon complied.  The organization had not 
been shown to have broken any laws and, because of this, the punishment is not a legal one 
but based on realpolitik.  Donations and server space have been obstructed because the 
organization leaked documents the U.S. does not approve of. 
CONCLUSION  
This study focused on the intersection between realpolitik, state secrecy, state crime, 
and the WikiLeaks controversy.  After establishing the realpolitik philosophy of governance 
as a means to understand state crime and state secrecy, the statements and actions of 
political officials towards WikiLeaks following the release of the diplomatic cables were 
analyzed.  Emphasis was placed on revealing the realpolitik nature of these reactions.  Two 
general rhetorical mechanisms were found to be used by political officials regarding whistle-Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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blowing and WikiLeaks.  The first was arbitrary rhetoric which involved politicians 
simultaneously (1) creating an impression of government support for whistle-blowing and 
government transparency and (2) allowing themselves the ability to interpret who qualifies 
as a whistle-blower.  The second mechanism was condemnation or labeling.  For the state 
to claim a person (or a group) is not a whistle-blower, she or he must be described in a way 
which makes it appropriate for the state to not consider them a whistle-blower (such as 
describing the person as a “terrorist”).       
After studying WikiLeaks controversy and the subsequent political fallout, three 
questions emerge, “was the fiery rhetoric worth it?  Was it justifiable considering the 
content of the cables?  Did the documents give enough information to be a substantial 
danger to the United States?”  The answer to all three seems to be “no.”  Immediately after 
formal data collection ended, an article was published in Reuters discussing the Obama 
Administration’s assessment of the damage that could be inflicted by the leaked diplomatic 
cables (Hosenball, 2011).  In a briefing that occurred in late 2010, State Department 
officials informed Congress that U.S. foreign policy should remain relatively undamaged 
(Hosenball, 2011).  Despite the containability of the WikiLeaks fallout, the Obama 
Administration felt that it should declare the release of the diplomatic cables as damaging in 
order to rally support for legal efforts to bring down WikiLeaks and the leakers (Hosenball, 
2011).  This tactic is similar to what happened regarding the supposed fallout from the 
release of the war logs.  The Pentagon reviewed the documents and found no evidence the 
documents posed a threat to American troops (Isikoff, 2010).  As Leigh & Harding (2011) 
state, “no one has been able to demonstrate any damage to life or limb” (p. 6).  
If these leaks were assessed to provide little to no damage, why was there so much 
discussion about the potential danger they present?  Manjikian (2010) offers some insight 
into an explanation.  According to her, from a realist (realpolitik) perspective, information 
acts as an effective weapon.  While she is specifically referring to state-waged information Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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warfare, one can see that if the state views information as an effective weapon for their 
purposes then it will recognize information can be used as a weapon against it—hence the 
heavy use of the state secrets privilege (Zieger, 2008).  While the leaks may not have been 
considered dangerous, they may have been perceived as a political information bomb aimed 
at undermining the U.S. governments’ legitimacy.  
It is important to note that the Administration has shown some restraint in pursuing 
WikiLeaks.  In mid-January 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department refused to blacklist the 
organization (Weller, 2011).  Blacklisting would have allowed the government to prevent 
and/or punish anyone engaged in economic dealings with Assange or WikiLeaks.  In 
addition, Representative Ron Paul openly defended whistle-blowing and organizations like 
WikiLeaks (Linkins, 2010).  In an excerpt from a speech he gave on the House floor which 
represents his general view on the matter he inquired, “Was it not once considered patriotic 
to stand up to our government when it is wrong?  Thomas Jefferson had it right when he 
advised 'Let the eyes of vigilance never be closed'” (as quoted in Linkins, 2010).  This 
demonstrates not every decision or decision maker exemplifies realpolitik in this situation.  
In addition, during this time a bill worked its way through the legislation which sought to 
create greater protections for government whistle-blowers (Smith, 2010).  The bill passed 
the house but halted in the senate after an “unnamed senator” held up the bill.  While in the 
House, the bill was also altered to exempt national security and intelligence employees from 
the added protections provided by the new bill.   
The realpolitik perspective is invaluable in understanding the WikiLeaks controversy.  
The perspective contributes to our understanding of the motivations of nation-states and 
how actions and rhetoric are driven by these motivations.  Various explanations—ranging 
from radical to mundane—may be used to explain the various motivations themselves but 
realpolitik serves to explain the interest-based mode of governance as a whole, not just the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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individual interests.  The U.S. government is acting towards WikiLeaks out of its own 
interests for power and control.   
  Realpolitik informs and drives a great deal of the political rhetoric in the United 
States.  This is dangerous because it can cloud our perceptions of the relevance and 
pertinence of the leaked documents.  Actions taken on the basis of realpolitik can also have 
severe implications for our rights as citizens within the United States.  For example, some 
have suggested that extending various laws to prosecute Julian Assange and WikiLeaks can 
have negative implications for Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Speech (Kohn, 2010).  
While it may have been illegal to disclose these documents, failing to fairly and justly treat 
leakers/whistle-blowers erodes our ability to hold the U.S. government accountable for its 
behavior, as exemplified by the treatment of PFC Bradley Manning. Citizens will be reluctant 
to whistle-blow if they will face stiff and unfair retribution.  Of course, the idea of holding an 
international superpower accountable for its actions may be a kite dream.  Shifting 
realpolitik governance may be a difficult if not impossible task to undergo without making 
massive political changes.  That said, a positive step in the right direction would be 
increased protections for whistleblowers.  While this may not yield substantive changes it 
would serve to help protect the political rights of individuals.   
 Moving forward, more research is necessary to establish the extent of realpolitik 
governance in governmental decision making and actions.  In addition, future research 
should address the limitations of the current study in order to verify the findings presented 
here.  The first limitation is this study’s use of secondary data sources.  Searches through 
government officials’ or agencies’ press statements would serve as a significant source of 
data for further inquiry.  The second limitation is this study was limited by a small sample 
size.  Again, this could be resolved by referring to primary data sources.  Systematically 
gathering of these sources could be problematic and would probably be time-consuming but 
future analysis would be better for it.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Wikileaks and Realpolitik 
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As demonstrated, realpolitik may prove to be a vital perspective in the years to come 
for understanding the social problems wrought by conflicts over government transparency, 
whistle-blowing, and state secrecy in our increasingly globalized world as seen in situations 
like WikiLeaks’ release of the diplomatic cables.  Scholars would do well to employ 
Realpolitik explanations into future studies of state behavior. 
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Endnotes 
1 Former chief of staff to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. Quoted in Goodman, 
2010. 
2 The Onion Router (TOR) is a piece of software which protects the user against 
various forms of online surveillance. TOR works by hiding the user’s connections within the 
totality of traffic occurring over TOR’s network. This prevents a person monitoring network 
traffic from seeing who the user is connected to. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a form of data 
encryption. PGP essentially makes the data unreadable except for those who have a key to 
decipher the data. Encryption can be “ciphered” (or cracked) but the more sophisticated the 
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3 List of statements: (1) Secretary Clinton’s response to the release of the diplomatic 
cables; (2) Vice President Biden’s, (3) Senator McConnell’s, (4) Assistant Secretary of State 
of Public Affairs Crowley’s, and (5) Representative King’s comparison of WikiLeaks to 
terrorists; (6) Senator Lieberman’s suggestion that The New York Times violated the 
Espionage Act of 1917; (7) Secretary Clinton’s, (8) former Press Secretary Gibbs’, (9) 
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4 List of actions: (1) arrest of Bradley Manning; (2) Obama Administration’s attempt 
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